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Ian Storey and Malcolm 
Cook, Senior Fellow 
and VisiƟng Senior 
Fellow, respecƟvely, at 
ISEAS‐Yusof Ishak 
InsƟtute, Singapore, 
explain that “In 
Southeast Asia, what 
we are witnessing thus 
far is less a rupture 
event and more an 
amplificaƟon of the 
current geopoliƟcal 
dynamics.” 
The COVID‐19 outbreak has spawned a plethora of commentaries forecasƟng the geopoliƟcal 
consequences of the pandemic. For some observers the virus has caused a decisive shiŌ in the 
balance of influence, with China emerging as the paramount power (especially in the Indo‐Pacific) and 
America teetering on the brink of losing its status as global hegemon. Other pundits have offered less 
paradigm‐shiŌing assessments: that COVID‐19 is unlikely to upend the exisƟng internaƟonal order but 
may catalyze exisƟng global trends. 
Four months into what is very likely to be a long and wrenching crisis it is, of course, very difficult to 
make predicƟons. However, we believe that at least in Southeast Asia, what we are witnessing thus 
far is less a rupture event and more an amplificaƟon of the current geopoliƟcal dynamics. COVID‐19 
has led to a sharp deterioraƟon in U.S.‐China relaƟons and this has reinforced negaƟve views of both 
countries in Southeast Asia and exacerbated regional concerns about escalaƟng superpower rivalry. 
Same Game 
Some analysts argue that China is using the pandemic to change the rules of the game in the South 
China Sea in its favor. During the COVID‐19 crisis China has undertaken a series of acƟviƟes which 
have Ɵcked up tensions in the contested waters. In February a Chinese warship turned its fire‐control 
radar on a Philippine Navy ship in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ); in March a China 
Coast Guard vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat; in April a Chinese survey ship 
entered the EEZs of Vietnam and Malaysia; shortly thereaŌer Beijing announced new administraƟon 
units to govern the Paracels and Spratlys and named 80 geographical features in the South China Sea. 
During this whole period, both the U.S. and Chinese navies undertook high‐profile exercises in the 
area, while the U.S. Navy conducted three “freedom of navigaƟon operaƟons” (FONOPs) in the South 
China Sea (10 March, and 28 and 29 April). 
To be sure China is no doubt gleeful that the United States and Southeast Asian claimants are 
preoccupied with tackling the virus. But none of the above incidents are game changers in the South 
China Sea; they have become rouƟne events and likely would have happened with or without COVID‐
19. The United States was expected to increase the frequency of its FONOPs in 2020; China has sunk 
Southeast Asian fishing vessels before (including a Philippine boat last June); Chinese survey ships 
were operaƟng off the Vietnamese and Malaysian coast last year; and as expected Hanoi and Manila 
have protested all of China’s moves to buƩress its jurisdicƟonal claims. A real game changer would 
have been an announcement by China that it was establishing an Air Defense IdenƟficaƟon Zone 
(ADIZ) over the Spratlys or indicaƟons that it had started reclamaƟon work at Scarborough Shoal. 
Nothing has fundamentally changed in the South China Sea: China conƟnues to assert its claims, 
America responds with more FONOPs, and the Southeast Asian claimants look on with concern and a 
degree of fatalism.  
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But the outbreak of COVID‐19 among sailors aboard the aircraŌ carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, and 
the perceived lack of U.S. leadership during the crisis, have deepened fears in Southeast Asia 
concerning America’s commitment to the region. At the same Ɵme, Beijing’s bout of asserƟve 
behavior in the South China Sea is being seen as opportunisƟc and extremely unhelpful at a Ɵme 
when ASEAN and China are supposed to be negoƟaƟng a Code of Conduct to reduce tensions (those 
negoƟaƟons are currently on hold due to COVID‐19).  
No Winner 
What is true for the South China Sea is true for Southeast Asia more broadly. In the region, so far 
neither the United States nor China is a clear geopoliƟcal beneficiary of the pandemic. Instead, 
Southeast Asia worries that the regional externaliƟes of this superpower rivalry are being 
exacerbated.  
The ISEAS‐Yusof Ishak InsƟtute’s State of Southeast Asia 2020 Survey Report released in January 
clearly indicates that doubts about China and the United States respecƟvely weighed heavily before 
COVID‐19 spread from China to Southeast Asia, as did concerns about their rivalry. With regard to 
China, 72 percent of regional policy elites polled expressed concern about Beijing’s’s growing 
economic influence, and 85 percent about China’s growing strategic and poliƟcal influence. Two‐
thirds had liƩle or no confidence in China’s new, purportedly more inclusive BRI approach, while only 
one out of every 67 respondents agreed with Beijing’s narraƟve that China is a benevolent power. 
The spread of COVID‐19 from China to Southeast Asia, abeƩed by memories of the same paƩern for 
the SARS epidemic in 2003, likely will deepen concerns about China’s influence on and in Southeast 
Asia. Beijing’s conƟnuing aggression in the South China Sea during the pandemic will hardly convince 
many of its benevolence regardless of how many medical supplies China donates. 
Results for the United States in this survey were beƩer than those for China but sƟll bad and 
discordant with the Trump administraƟon’s rhetoric of heightened engagement. Three‐quarters of 
those polled agreed that U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia had fallen under the Trump 
administraƟon. Only one in ten respondents disagreed. Nearly 50 percent of survey respondents 
expressed liƩle confidence in the United States as a strategic partner, while twice as many viewed 
China as the leading strategic power in the region compared with the United States. America 
suffering the highest number of total COVID‐19 infecƟons and deaths globally and the internaƟonal 
media’s criƟcal coverage of the Trump administraƟon’s pandemic response likely will add to these 
doubts.  
Southeast Asian states want greater internaƟonal cooperaƟon to address the pandemic and its social 
effects. However, the pandemic has made the U.S.‐China rivalry more virulent, greatly constraining 
cooperaƟon between the world’s only two superpowers. This will undoubtedly deepen Southeast 
Asian concerns about the regional implicaƟons of the U.S.‐China rivalry and hurt the image of both 
powers as well. 
Currently, the geopoliƟcs of the COVID‐19 pandemic in Southeast Asia look bad for the United States, 
China and the region itself. Southeast Asian countries are looking beyond the first wave of the 
pandemic to a more uncertain and daunƟng future. The United States and China individually and 
through effecƟve cooperaƟon could help reverse this lose‐lose‐lose situaƟon and improve their 
images in Southeast Asia. 
"The pandemic has 
made the U.S.‐China 
rivalry more virulent, 
greatly constraining 
cooperaƟon between 
the world’s only two 
superpowers. This will 
undoubtedly deepen 
Southeast Asian 
concerns about the 
regional implicaƟons of 
the U.S.‐China rivalry, 
and hurt the image of 
both powers as well.”  
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